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Abstract 
 Religion has long been speculated to function as a strategy to ameliorate our fear of 
death. Terror Management Theory provides two possible causal pathways through which 
religious beliefs can fulfill this function. According to the “worldview defense” account of 
terror management, worldviews reduce death anxiety by offering symbolic immortality: on 
this view, only people who accept the religious worldview in question should benefit from 
religious beliefs. Alternatively, religious worldviews also offer literal immortality, and may 
do so independently of individuals’ worldviews. Both strands of thought appear in the Terror 
Management Theory literature. In this paper, we attempt to resolve this issue experimentally 
by manipulating religious belief and measuring explicit (Study 1) and implicit (Study 2) 
death anxiety. In Study 1, we found that the effect of religious belief on explicit death anxiety 
depends critically on participants’ own religious worldview, such that believers and non-
believers reported greater death anxiety when their worldview is threatened. In Study 2, 
however, we find that religious belief alleviates implicit death anxiety amongst both believers 
and non-believers. These findings suggest that religious beliefs can alleviate death anxiety at 
two different levels, by offering symbolic and literal immortality respectively.  
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Testing the causal relationship between religious belief and death anxiety 
 
Religious belief – the belief in supernatural agents or events – is a prominent and enduring 
feature of human psychology (Atran, 2002; Barrett, 2004; Boyer, 2001; Pyysiainen, 2009; 
Whitehouse, 2004). Billions of people worldwide, both historically and currently, hold 
religious beliefs, and even those who explicitly repudiate such beliefs often reveal some 
implicit acceptance of them (Jong, Halberstadt, & Bluemke, 2012; Uhlmann, Poehlman, & 
Bargh, 2008). The ubiquity of religiosity is surprising, not least given the elusiveness of 
religious entities and the cost of religiously-prescribed lifestyles in terms of time, tangible 
and cognitive resources and, arguably, reproductive opportunity (e.g., Jackson, Halberstadt, 
Jong, & Felman, 2015). Why then, given the sacrifices associated with adhering to religious 
beliefs, and the lack of evidence that any are true, do so many worldwide continue to believe? 
The enigma of religious belief is neither new nor uncharted. Although the 
underpinnings of belief are no doubt multiply determined, Terror Management Theory 
(TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) has prominently linked religious belief to 
the fear of death (Vail, Rothschild, Weise, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2010). 
According to TMT, humans are uniquely aware of their own vulnerability and inevitable 
death, which, were it not for strategic psychological buffers, would cause debilitating anxiety. 
Religion provides a particularly effective buffer by addressing death anxiety in two ways. 
First, like any venerable cultural institution, religious groups provide “symbolic immortality” 
by allowing individuals to belong and commit to entities that are larger and more enduring 
than themselves (Landau, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2004; Vail et al., 2010). Second, unlike 
other secular alternatives, many major belief systems (including Christianity, Hinduism, and 
Islam, which together claim more than half the world’s population) offer opportunities for 
literal immortality (e.g., in the form of an afterlife or reincarnation; Atran, 2002). Thus, from 
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this perspective, these religions provide a unique, two-fold solution to the problem of death 
anxiety.  
Despite the intuitive appeal of religiosity as an effective buffer against death anxiety, 
previous research has produced mixed support for this claim. Several correlational studies 
have found religious people to be less fearful of death than their non-religious counterparts 
(Avarado, Templer, Bresler, & Thomas-Dobson, 1995; Feifel & Branscombe, 1973; Harding, 
Flannelly, Weaver, & Costa, 2005; Wen, 2010). However, there are also studies that have 
found correlations in the opposite direction (Cohen et al., 2005; Dezutter, Luyckx, & 
Hutsebaut, 2009; Donovan, 1994; Ellis, Wahab, & Ratnasingan, 2013; Spilka, Hood, & 
Rosuch, 2009). Still other studies have found no association at all (Rasmussen & Johnson, 
1994; Templer & Dotson, 1970), or a nonlinear association, such that committed theists and 
committed atheists both report less death anxiety than individuals with more moderate beliefs 
(Halberstadt & Jong, 2013 Nelson & Cantrell, 1980). Studies manipulating mortality salience 
to examine religiosity have produced similarly mixed results, finding alternatively that 
mortality salience increases religious belief universally (Hansen & Norenzayan, 2006, studies 
1 & 2), and that it only increases belief amongst individuals who are already highly religious 
(Hansen & Norenzayan, 2006, studies 3 & 4; Jonas & Fischer, 2006; Osarchuk & Tatz, 1973).  
A direct experimental test of the buffering effects of religious belief on death anxiety 
is conspicuously absent (though see Heflick and Goldenberg, 2012 for an indirect test).  One 
reason for this gap in literature is undoubtedly that religious beliefs are strongly held and 
difficult to change (McCullough, Enders, Brion, & Jain, 2005; Wink & Dillon, 2001). When 
Batson (1975) tried to do so, using a “news article” reporting that the New Testament was a 
fake, he found that participants who believed the article reported stronger religious belief 
afterwards (see also Festinger, Riecken & Schachter’s, 1954, classic account of The Seekers, 
a doomsday cult that redoubled its faith upon disconfirmation of their prophecy). Tetlock and 
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colleagues (2000) found that participants were reluctant even to contemplate a challenge to 
their religious beliefs. Christians rejected “heretical” Biblical counterfactuals (e.g., “If Jesus 
had not chosen Judas as one of his 12 disciples, Jesus would not have been betrayed or 
crucified”), responding with “moral outrage” and expressing their intention to support the 
church in the future. 
 Some researchers have responded to the challenge of shifting religious beliefs by 
manipulating the accessibility of religious concepts (see Shariff, Williard, Andersen, & 
Norenzayan, 2015, for a meta-analysis), but such efforts, in theory, only make salient the 
beliefs participants already hold; they do not change them. (Consistent with this interpretation, 
Shariff et al.’s meta-analysis found that religious priming influences behavior only for 
religious individuals.) Others have attempted to challenge beliefs directly, with unclear 
results.  For example, Shariff, Cohen, and Norenzayan (2008) found that participants who 
read a brief anti-religion passage by prominent atheist Richard Dawkins reported less 
religiosity on both explicit and implicit measures compared to controls. Because participants’ 
prior religious beliefs were not reported, however (only their religious identities, i.e., 
Christian, Muslim, etc.), it is not clear the extent to which Dawkins’ arguments were actually 
counterattitudinal. In contrast, Friedman and Rholes (2007) challenged a group of religious 
believers by pointing out contradictions in the Gospels’ account of Jesus’ Resurrection. Their 
manipulation was successful, in the sense that participants were more willing to acknowledge 
the contradictions after reading about them, but there was no direct evidence that the 
acknowledgement changed their beliefs about the Resurrection, much less their religious 
beliefs more generally (e.g., belief in God). In any case, none of these manipulations have 
been explored in the context of death anxiety.  
A further complication for testing the buffering hypothesis is that both “religious 
belief” and “death anxiety” are multifaceted constructs, and each comprises explicit and 
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implicit elements. Indeed, previous studies have shown that people do not always have 
conscious access to their beliefs (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), and that implicit and explicit 
measures do not always correspond to or predict behavior to the same degree (Hofmann, 
Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). This distinction between the explicit and 
the implicit does not apply only to beliefs, but also to more affective states such as attitudes 
and goals. Recent research has found that unconscious emotions can affect our behaviour 
even when we do not consciously experience them (Winkielman & Berridge, 2004).  
There is also now some evidence that explicit and implicit religious belief are 
dissociable states. Using an explicit measure of belief, Jong et al. (2012) found a “worldview 
defense” pattern in response to death anxiety, such that self-described religious people 
reported greater belief and non-religious people reported reduced belief. However, using an 
implicit measure of religious belief (a single target-implicit association test; ST-IAT; 
Bluemke & Friese, 2008), which measures the strength of association between religious and 
“existence” concepts, Jong et al. (2012) found that all participants’ religious belief increased, 
regardless of their stated religious identity (see also Heflick & Goldenberg, 2012).  
Jong et al.’s (2012) results are consistent with the idea that religious belief provides 
two complementary antidotes to death anxiety; symbolically via explicit worldview defense; 
and literally, via an implicit association with between religious concepts and immortality. 
However the fact that individuals bolster religious beliefs when reminded of death is no 
evidence at all that they are justified in doing so. The purpose of the reported research was 
therefore to provide a first, direct test of religiosity’s effectiveness in reducing death anxiety, 
measured both explicitly and, for the first time in this context, implicitly.  In the process we 
designed a novel manipulation of religious belief that relies on the well-documented “ease of 
retrieval” effect (Schwarz et al., 2002; Wänke, 2013), in which people’s beliefs are 
influenced by the ease with which they are able to generate reasons for them (see Tversky & 
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Kahneman, 1973). For example, Schwarz et al. (2002) asked participants to list either 6 or 12 
assertive behaviors. Although those in the list-12 condition listed more behaviors overall, 
they nevertheless judged themselves as less assertive than participants in the list-6 condition, 
apparently because they interpreted the difficulty of the task as evidence that they seldom 
showed assertiveness.  Schwartz et al.’s research concerns shifts in participants’ self-concept, 
but analogous procedures have been used to produce attitude change (e.g., Hansen & Wänke, 
2008).  
In the current studies, we use an ease-of retrieval paradigm to temporarily manipulate 
participants’ religious belief, in order to test the causal effect of such belief on death anxiety. 
The presumption, as in previous work, is that religious belief will be undermined to the extent 
that one finds it difficult to justify this belief. To determine just what level of justification 
participants would find difficult, we conducted a Pilot Study, the results of which informed a 
manipulation of religiosity, which we then implemented before measuring death anxiety 
explicitly (Study 1) and implicitly (Study 2). To determine whether the influence of 
religiosity depended on participants’ prior beliefs, we assessed those beliefs directly (rather 
than relying on self-reported religious identity) and included them as a second factor in all 
analyses. 
 
Pilot Study 
Method  
Participants  
Thirty female and seven male Psychology undergraduate students at the University of 
Otago in New Zealand participated in exchange for partial course credit.  
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Materials and Procedure 
In all studies reported herein, participants were tested in light and sound attenuated 
experimental rooms containing an Apple iMac 21-inch computer workstation. After 
providing informed consent and some demographic information, and completing another, 
unrelated procedure, participants were given an argument-listing task. Instructions at the top 
of a sheet of paper explained our interest in “the reasons people provide to support different 
sides of an issue,” and that the participant’s topic was “The existence of God.”  They were 
asked to list as many reason as possible to support the statement that “God exists,” and, 
below that, to list reasons to support the statement that “God does not exist” (order of topics 
was counterbalanced). When they could think of no more reasons for either proposition 
participants were instructed to contact the experimenter, who debriefed them on all 
procedures they completed.  
 
Results and Discussion  
 Participants listed an average of 4.5 arguments for God’s existence (SD = 2.7; range = 
1 to 12), compared to 5.0 arguments for God’s nonexistence (SD = 2.5, range =1 to 16), 
values which did not differ significantly, t(36) = 1.30, p = .21.   
Participants were coded as religious (10 “Christian,” 5 “other”) or nonreligious (n = 
22) based on their responses to a question about their “religion” (Christian, None, Other) on 
the demographics questionnaire. The numbers of arguments listed were analyzed in a 2 
(argument type: for God’s existence versus nonexistence) × 2 (argument order: pro-God 
arguments first versus second) × 2 (participant religiosity) mixed model Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA), with the first factor treated as a repeated measure. The analysis revealed an 
interaction between argument type and participant religiosity, F(1, 33) = 4.50, p < .05, 
  
hp
2
 
= .12. Nonreligious participants listed more arguments against God’s existence than for 
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God’s existence (Ms = 5.2 versus 4.0, p < .05), while religious participants listed numerically, 
though nonsignificantly, more arguments for God’s existence than against (Ms = 5.1 versus 
4.7, p = .51). Argument type also interacted with argument order, F(1, 33) = 4.23, p < .05, 
  
hp
2
= .12. All participants listed more arguments for the first proposition they considered than for 
the second, but the difference was only significant when the second proposition was God’s 
nonexistence (Ms = 4.9 versus 3.7, p < .005).  
 Most important for the subsequent studies, most participants spontaneously listed 
fewer than five arguments, and only one participant (2.7% of the sample) listed more than 
twelve, for either proposition, suggesting that generating twelve arguments is a subjectively 
difficult task. However, because the number of arguments listed did vary with participant 
religiosity, religiosity will be treated as a second, pseudo-independent variable in subsequent 
analyses, and number of arguments generated will be treated as a covariate. 
 
Study 1 
Having found a degree of argumentation that participants find difficult (but presumably not 
unreasonable), we exploited this difficulty as a subtle manipulation of religious belief. Thus, 
in Study 1, participants listed twelve reasons for the existence of God or against the existence 
of God. Because both tasks, according to the pilot study, are well beyond what participants 
spontaneously achieve, we expected either to be experienced as difficult, and taken as 
evidence against the target belief; thus, arguing for and against God’s existence represents, in 
this case, the “disbelief” and “belief” conditions, respectively. Our question was whether 
experimentally manipulated believers report less death anxiety than disbelievers, either as a 
main effect or qualified by participants’ pre-existing religious beliefs. 
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Method 
Participants. Ninety-one female and 29 male native English-speaking volunteers between the 
ages of 17 and 41 years (Mage = 21.3, SD = 4.2) served as participants. Seventy-four were first 
or second year undergraduate psychology students of the University of Otago who received 
course credit in exchange for their participation. The remainder were non-psychology 
students recruited via the University of Otago’s Psychology Department research 
participation website, and were reimbursed NZ$15 to cover their travel expenses. An 
additional 13 participants who were non-native English speakers, and/or who indicated 
relatively less proficiency in English were run in the study, but their data were not analyzed. 
 
Materials. Religious belief was manipulated using the argument generation task described in 
the pilot study, except that participants listed arguments for only one proposition, either that 
“God exists” (disbelief condition), or that “God does not exist” (the belief condition). In 
addition, because recent research indicates that ease-of-retrieval effects are sensitive to 
context, and particularly to the difference between experienced and expected ease (Lick & 
Johnson, 2015), participants in the disbelief and belief conditions were told that “most 
religious [nonreligious] individuals find it easy to generate twelve reasons in about five 
minutes,” although, we added, participants could take as long as they liked. These 
instructions were added to increase the likelihood that participants made an internal 
attribution after failing to list the sufficient number of reasons.  
Pre-existing religious beliefs were measured using the Supernatural Beliefs Scale 
(SBS; Jong, Bluemke, & Halberstadt, 2013), a highly reliable measure of religious belief 
(Cronbach’s α = .93). The SBS consists of ten items related to religious supernatural agents, 
events and places (e.g., “There exists an all-powerful, all-knowing, loving God”). Participants 
indicated their agreement with each statement on a nine-point Likert scale ranging from –4 
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(strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree), and SBS scores were established by calculating the 
mean of the 10 ratings. A score of zero is indicative of agnosticism, while a score less than or 
greater than zero is indicative of disbelief or belief, respectively, in supernatural religious 
concepts, a core aspect of religiosity (Jong et al., 2013). 
Death anxiety was assessed using the Death Anxiety Questionnaire (DAQ; Conte et 
al., 1982), a brief, well-validated measure of fear of various (correlated) aspects of death.  
The scale consists of fifteen statements (e.g., “Does it bother you that you may die before you 
have done everything you wanted to do?”), to which participants respond on a three-point 
scale: 0 (‘not at all’), 1 (‘somewhat’), or 2 (‘very much’). A mean of these responses 
(Cronbach’s α = .83) was calculated to establish a single death anxiety score. 
 
Procedure. The experiment was run among several other unrelated studies. Participants 
completed a demographics questionnaire and the SBS, followed by the experimental 
manipulation and then the DAQ. All measures were completed on paper, and the procedure 
took approximately 30 minutes. Participants were debriefed at the conclusion of all tasks.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Following Jong et al. (2012), participants were categorized based on their SBS scores as 
either “religious” (SBS > 0; 40% of the sample) or “non-religious” (SBS < 0; 56% of the 
sample). Four percent of participants recorded SBS scores of exactly zero and were not 
included in the following analyses. Men and women did not differ in their religiosity in either 
Study 1 or Study 2. Figure 1 shows the full distribution of participant religiosity.  
 
--Insert Figure 1 about here-- 
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Arguments 
Overall, participants listed an average of 8.2 arguments (SD = 3.5), with the majority (64%) 
listing fewer than 12. The numbers of arguments were analyzed in a 2 (experimental 
condition: belief versus disbelief) × 2 (participant religiosity: religious vs. non-religious) 
between subjects ANOVA, revealing that religious participants listed more arguments (M = 
9.0, SE = .50) than non-religious participants (M = 7.6, SE = .42), F(1, 111) = 4.63, p =.03, 
  
hp
2
 = .04. Additionally, a marginal main effect of experimental condition emerged, such that 
participants in the belief condition (arguing, with effort, against the existence of God) listed 
more arguments (M = 8.9, SE = .46), than participants in the disbelief condition (M = 7.7, SE 
= .46), F(1, 111) = 3.68, p = .06, 
  
hp
2
 = .01. There was no interaction (p > .40).  
 
Death Anxiety 
The same model was used to analyze death anxiety scores (data from two participants who 
did not complete the DAQ were not included in this analysis), with number of generated 
arguments as a covariate. The analysis revealed only a significant interaction, F(1, 108) = 
5.96, p = .02, 
  
hp
2
 = .05, depicted in Figure 2. Separate one-way ANCOVAs clarified that non-
believers were significantly more death anxious in the belief condition (M = .96, SE = .06) 
than in the disbelief condition (M = .75, SE = .06), F(1, 62) = 5.51, p = .02, 
  
hp
2
 = .08. 
Believers were non-significantly less death anxious in the belief condition (M = .80, SE 
= .08) than in the disbelief condition (M = .91, SE = .08), F(1, 45) = 1.05, p = .31, 
  
hp
2
 = .02. 
Seen from another perspective, compared to nonreligious individuals, religious individuals 
were less anxious in the belief condition (p = .08), but more anxious in the disbelief 
conditions (p = .054). 
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--Insert Figure 2 about here-- 
 
These results validated the difficulty of our ease of retrieval task, and also found a 
TMT-consistent effect of religiosity on death anxiety. The majority of participants could not 
list the expected number of reasons for (or against) God’s existence. As such, participants 
appear to have adjusted their self-reported death anxiety based on whether their worldview 
was affirmed or threatened: non-religious participants reported significantly more death 
anxiety when they had difficulty listing reasons against God’s existence, while religious 
participants reported non-significantly more death anxiety when they had trouble listing 
reasons for God’s existence. Furthermore, this effect did not vary based on the number of 
reasons that participants listed, suggesting that the mere difficulty of listing 12 reasons – 
rather than the failure to list so many reasons – drove participants’ attitude change.  
 
Study 2 
As in previous research on religiosity and death anxiety (Jong et al., 2012, Study 1), Study 1 
revealed a relationship between religiosity and death anxiety that depended critically on 
participants’ own religious belief. This effect is congruent with a TMT account of religion’s 
motivational function (e.g. Landau, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2004), but does not align 
religiosity’s unique ability to offer literal death anxiety, which we have found manifested via 
implicit cognition. Therefore, to test whether religiosity can act as a buffer against implicit 
death anxiety for both believers and non-believers, we conducted a follow-up study. The 
procedure of our follow-up was identical to that used in Study 1, except that death anxiety 
was measured implicitly via a single target implicit association test (ST-IAT; Bluemke & 
Friese, 2008), a version of the Implicit Association Test adapted to measure the association 
between a single target and two attributes – in this case, between “death” and “fear.” 
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Method 
Participants 
 Fifty-four female and 41 male native English speakers between the ages of 18 and 61 
years (Mage = 24.4, SD = 6.9) completed the study in conjunction with another, unrelated 
procedure. All participants were first or second year undergraduate psychology students of 
the University of Otago who received course credit in return for their participation. An 
additional two participants’ data were lost due to technical problems. An additional 12 non-
native English speakers were run in the study, but their data were not analyzed. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
The procedure was similar to that of Study 1, with the exception that death anxiety 
was measured via the ST-IAT, which measures the automatic association between the 
concepts of death and anxiety, relative to death and calmness. This task, programmed and 
presented on SuperLab development software for Macintosh (Haxby, Parasuraman, Lalonde, 
& Abboud, 1993), consists of three blocks, always presented in the same order. The first 
block consisted of 36 practice trials, in which participants simply classified words as 
synonyms of either calm (restful, calm, tranquil, serene, peaceful, and relaxed) or anxious 
(restless, nervous, anxious, worried, upset, and distressed), by pressing the ‘z’ and ‘/’ keys, 
respectively (pairing of attribute words with response keys was kept constant across blocks). 
In block two, participants classified words as synonyms of either calm, or of anxious or death 
(perished, entombed, buried, deceased, dead, dying). Finally, in block three, the target-
attribute pairing was reversed: participants classified words as synonyms of either calm or 
death, or of anxious. On each trial a target word was presented in the center of the screen in 
72 point ‘Calibri’ font, preceded by a 500ms fixation cross (‘+’), and removed only when the 
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participant made the correct response. There were 72 trials in each of the critical blocks 
(blocks two and three), during which participants classified 18 different words four times 
each, in individually randomized order. 
  
Results and Discussion 
Based on participants SBS scores, the sample consisted of 32% religious and 66% 
nonreligious participants (2% recorded SBS scores of exactly at the midpoint and were not 
included in the following analyses). Figure 3 shows the full distribution of participant 
religiosity.  
 
--Insert Figure 3 about here-- 
 
Arguments 
Overall, participants listed an average of 7.93 arguments (SD = 3.73), with the 
majority (67%) listing fewer than 12. The numbers of arguments were analyzed in a 2 
(experimental condition: belief versus disbelief) × 2 (participant religiosity: religious vs. non-
religious) between subjects ANOVA, which revealed only an interaction, F(1, 91) = 6.61, p 
= .01, 
  
hp
2
 = .07. As in the pretest, non-religious participants provided more arguments for 
God’s non-existence than for God’s existence (Ms = 9.00 versus 6.00, SEs = .65 versus .61), 
t(1, 57) = 3.38, p =.001, but religious participants offered the equivalent numbers of 
arguments for both propositions (Ms = 8.25 versus 9.18, SEs = 1.04 versus .77). 
 
Death Anxiety 
 One participant’s ST-IAT data were lost due to computer error. ST-IAT scores were 
calculated using a variant of Greenwald’s D3 algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek & Banaji, 2003). 
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Responses slower than 10,000ms were excluded and the remaining correct responses were 
standardized within participant. Implicit death anxiety was defined as the difference between 
participants’ standardized mean reaction time on death-calm trials, and their standardized 
mean reaction time on death-anxiety trials, such that higher values reflected greater death 
anxiety. This index was entered into a 2 (condition) × 2 (religiosity) ANCOVA, controlling 
for number of arguments listed, which revealed only a main effect of condition: participants 
in the belief condition more closely associated death with calmness than with anxiety, 
compared to participants in the disbelief condition (Ms = .22 versus .36, SEs = .05), F(1, 90) 
= 4.30, p = .04, 
  
hp
2
 = .05.  Neither the main effect of religiosity nor the interaction was 
significant (ps = .51 and .84 respectively). Means, converted back to millisecond differences 
for ease of interpretation, appear in Figure 4. 
 
--Insert Figure 4 about here-- 
 
In summary, Study 2 replicated the effects associated with our ease of retrieval task, wherein 
the majority of participants were unable to list 12 reasons for or against God’s existence. 
Furthermore, using a novel measure of implicit death anxiety – the ST-IAT – we found that 
an ease of retrieval paradigm produced shifts in death anxiety that diverged from Study 1. 
Participants in this study reported lower implicit religiosity in the belief condition, an effect 
that was neither moderated by participants’ own self-reported belief, nor the number of 
reasons that participants were able to list.  
 
General Discussion 
Many researchers and scholars, including but not limited to Terror Management theorists, 
have argued for a causal role of religious belief in managing death anxiety (Freud, 1925; 
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Jonas & Fischer, 2006; Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006; Soenke, Landau, & Greenberg, 2013; 
Vail et al., 2010). While there is now good evidence that people, even “nonreligious” people, 
gravitate toward supernatural religious beliefs when death is salient (Jong et al., 2012), there 
is little or no evidence that such movement is warranted in terms of mitigating death anxiety.  
The current studies provide the first experimental test of this hypothesis, and in the 
process, address a number of challenges faced by past research: Rather than challenge 
religious belief directly, a strategy likely to meet with resistance if not ironic strengthening of 
the challenged beliefs (Batson, 1975), we relied on the subjective experience of participants’ 
own arguments: Effectively, participants convinced themselves of the validity of their beliefs 
through the ease with which they were able to substantiate them. We also considered both 
implicit and explicit death anxiety, in recognition of participants’ possible inability or 
unwillingness to report on their emotional reactions (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
Winkelman & Berridge, 2004), and the fact that religious belief itself varies when assessed 
directly versus indirectly (Jong et al., 2012). Finally, to gauge participants’ religious beliefs 
in a more direct fashion than through their religious identity, we assessed such beliefs directly 
in each of our studies through the Supernatural Beliefs Scale. 
The results revealed interesting effects of religiosity on both measures of death 
anxiety, effects that in some ways mimic those found by Jong et al. (2012) when studying the 
effects of death anxiety on religious belief. Nonreligious participants reported less conscious 
fear of death when their perspective was strengthened than when it was weakened, but the 
opposite was true (albeit nonsignificantly) for believers. This result, at a minimum, clearly 
falsifies the claim that religious belief is soothing in all cases, but is consistent with TMT’s 
worldview defense hypothesis, in which identification with and participation in enduring 
social institutions provide symbolic immortality that is as much or more important than any 
particular ideology (Landau et al., 2004). In this account, irreligiosity is itself a worldview 
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that, when eroded (in this case, via participants’ difficulty in justifying it), has negative 
consequences for nonbelievers’ mortality concerns.  
However, when death anxiety was measured implicitly in Study 2, the results were 
very different: Participants whose confidence in God’s existence was bolstered showed less 
death anxiety than those whose confidence was weakened, regardless of their pre-existing 
religious beliefs. This effect is more consistent with the hypothesis that supernatural entities 
offer emotional benefits to all individuals, presumably via their unique potential to address 
mortality concerns literally, and not just symbolically.  
Recent research has offered some support for humans’ tendency to endorse 
supernatural religious concepts, what Norenzayan and Hansen (2006) term a “distinct 
cognitive inclination” toward religious belief, even while explicitly denying it. A small but 
remarkable literature on “implicit theism” (see Uhlman, Poehlman & Bargh, 2008, for one 
review), illustrates how individuals’ behaviors sometimes belie their explicit religious denials. 
For example, atheists worry about the behavior of the God they don’t believe in: Lindeman, 
Heywood, Riekki, and Makkonen (2014) found that they were just as physiologically aroused 
as religious participants when asked to challenge God to do terrible things (e.g., “I dare God 
to rape my friend”). Atheists are also unwilling to part with the soul they don’t think they 
have: Haidt, Björklund, and Murphy (2000) reported that most participants (including 
atheists) were unwilling to sell their soul to the experimenter, even when assured that the 
“contract” had no validity of any kind.  
Furthermore, Norenzayan and Hansen (2006) found that people affirm the gods they 
don’t believe in when confronted with thoughts of death: Participants primed with death 
endorsed the existence not only their own (Christian) god, but also culturally unfamiliar 
supernatural agents (e.g., Shamanic spirits) suggesting that participants at least assumed such 
endorsement would help assuage anxiety prompted by the prime. Heflick and Goldenberg 
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(2012) reported indirect evidence that this assumption could be warranted. American 
participants – both religious and nonreligious – read an account by a “Harvard Law School 
professor” either supporting or dismissing the religious implications of near-death 
experiences. Those who read the supportive paragraph showed less secular worldview 
defense (disagreement with an anti-American essay) than those who read the dismissive 
paragraph, regardless of whether they themselves were religious. The researchers deduced 
that even nonreligious participants had been using religious belief in some way to buffer 
death anxiety, as evidenced by their need for a substitute worldview-defensive strategy when 
the professor challenged those beliefs, although no measures of religious belief or death 
anxiety (or, for that matter, nationalism) were provided.  
Although we have interpreted our data in terms of two distinct pathways, one 
potentially unconscious, from religious belief to death anxiety, we consider the current 
research only suggestive, with further research clearly necessary. The idiosyncratic 
association between “death” and “fear” is only one way that death anxiety can be assessed 
implicitly, and future research should supplement it with emotional, physiological and 
behavioral markers of anxiety (Becker, 1973). Likewise, there are other, complementary 
ways that religiosity can be operationalized and manipulated.  “Belief” is a core component 
of religiosity, but it does not represent the totality, or even the majority, of “religiosity” as a 
vast and complex human endeavor (Atran & Norenzayan, 2002; McKay & Whitehouse, 
2014). Religious values, behaviors, and rituals, for example, may be prompted and influenced 
by death anxiety in different and unexpected ways.  
These caveats notwithstanding, the current research represents a novel demonstration 
of the complex motivational functions of religious belief. A subtle, self-generated change in 
confidence regarding God’s existence produced changes in both self-reported death anxiety, 
and in the association between “death” and “anxiety”. However, responses to the 
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manipulation depended on prior belief and how anxiety was assessed, such that relative 
nonbelievers reported less anxiety when their disbelief was bolstered than when it was eroded, 
yet showed more anxiety in the form of implicit cognitive associations to “death”.  We 
tentatively interpret the results in terms dual and complementary terror management 
techniques, with the potential to reconcile the sometimes-competing literal and symbolic 
functions of religious belief, and to provide broad framework for understanding religions 
endurance in a secularized world. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of participants' religious belief 
 
Figure 2. Explicit death anxiety by condition and religion 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of participants' religious belief 
 
Figure 4. Implicit death anxiety by condition and religion 
 
 
